WebSand: Server-driven Outbound Web-application Sandboxing
Since its birth in 1990, the Web has evolved from a simple, stateless delivery mechanism for static
hypertext documents to a fully-edged run-time environment for distributed, multi-party applications.
Security becomes increasingly important in this context, but is typically only an afterthought in this
process. The next wave, the Future Internet, will continue to rely on the same web application technology,
while adopting more p2p and mashup-style approaches. Today's server-centric solutions will give way to
a rich and stateful client-centric paradigm with even less manageable security and even more severe threats
to the web-based economy of the Future Internet. Data and services from multiple heterogeneous domains,
aggregated both on the server-side and on an end-user's client, demand for a novel, comprehensive security
solution that increases the user's trust into the technological infrastructure. WebSand tackles this demand
by departing from the observation that security should be server-driven. Even though security preferences
from end-users at the client-side have to be taken into account, only the service developers at the
server-side have the necessary expertise and context information to define the policies to be enforced.
Moreover, server-driven security can be deployed relatively easily, since much can be achieved without
updating the client-side platform.
SAP AG, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Chalmers Tekniska Högskola, Universität Passau, Siemens AG
Main WebSand Objectives
In the course of WebSand, a framework is developed that consists of four major building blocks:
- a secure interaction model, that allows explicit and fine-grained control concerning incoming Web communication,
- methods for secure end-to-end information flow control, to enforce confidentiality and integrity properties,
- behavioral sandbox environments for secure client-side and server-side composition of multi-origin components, and
- a declarative and expressive policy description mechanism that ties the individual components together into a unified security architecture spanning client and server.
Role of Uni Passau in WebSand
- leads the work package on secure interaction models (WP2),
- contributes to the requirements of the WebSand policy language,
- leads the activities concerning integrity requirements of intended control flow and the development of the central enforcement mechanism,
- participates in the enforcement of information-flow policies, with particular focus on synergy between server-side and client-side enforcement,
- explores code rewriting techniques, and
- hosts and maintains the the central integration lab.
- Daniel Hausknecht
- Korbinian Pauli
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